Android forensics: Automated data collection and reporting from a mobile device by Grover, Justin
Rochester Institute of Technology 
RIT Scholar Works 
Theses 
1-31-2013 
Android forensics: Automated data collection and reporting from 
a mobile device 
Justin Grover 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Grover, Justin, "Android forensics: Automated data collection and reporting from a mobile device" (2013). 
Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 













Bill Stackpole (chair) 
Dr. Tae Oh 
Dr. Yin Pan 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of  
Master of Science in Computing Security and Information 
Assurance 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
B. Thomas Golisano College 
of 







Android Forensics: Automated Data 
Collection and Reporting from a 
Mobile Device 
 




MP 1 3 00 3 8  






MITRE Sponsored Research 
Project: Android System Integrity Measurement 
Project No.: 51MSR606-TA 
 
The views, opinions and/or findings  
contained in this report are those of  
The MITRE Corporation and should  
not be construed as an official government 
position, policy, or decision, unless  
designated by other documentation. 
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution 
Unlimited. 13-0585 
 
©2013 The MITRE Corporation.  





As Android smartphones gain popularity, industry and government will face increasing pressure 
to integrate them into their environments. The implementation of these devices on an enterprise 
can save on costs and add capabilities previously unavailable; however, the organizations that 
incorporate this technology must be prepared to mitigate the associated risks. These devices can 
contain vast amounts of personal and work-related data that can impact internal investigations, 
including (but not limited to) those of policy violations, intellectual property theft, misuse, 
embezzlement, sabotage, and espionage. Physical access has been the traditional method for 
retrieving data useful to these investigations from Android devices, with the exception of some 
limited collection abilities in commercial mobile device management systems and remote 
enterprise forensics tools. As part of this thesis, a prototype enterprise monitoring system for 
Android smartphones was developed to continuously collect many of the data sets of interest to 
incident responders, security auditors, proactive security monitors, and forensic investigators. 
Many of the data sets covered were not found in other available enterprise monitoring tools. The 
prototype system neither requires root access privileges nor exploiting weaknesses in the Android 
architecture for proper operation, thereby increasing interoperability among Android devices and 
avoiding a spyware classification for the system. An anti-forensics analysis on the system was 
performed to identify and further strengthen areas vulnerable to tampering. The results of this 
research include the release of the first open-source Android enterprise monitoring solution of its 
kind, a comprehensive guide of data sets available for collection without elevated privileges, and 
the introduction of a novel design strategy implementing various Android application components 
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1 Introduction 
In the United States (U.S.), 121.3 million people—roughly one third of the population—owned a 
smartphone as of October 2012 (comScore, Inc., 2012; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The major 
players in the smartphone market included Google, Apple, Research In Motion (RIM), and 
Microsoft. Google’s Android platform showed significant gains, up to 53.6% of the market, while 
RIM continued its decline to 7.8% (comScore, Inc., 2012). As Google’s prevalence in the 
smartphone market grows, so will the pressure for organizations to move from existing mobile 
options to Android. These organizations include U.S. government agencies, some of which are 
considering transitioning from RIM to new smartphone systems (Kang, 2012; Lai, 2012; Marks, 
2012; Rauf, 2012). Some organizations have begun offering personnel the ability to use personal 
devices (including Android smartphones) on corporate networks under Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD) policies (Citrix, 2011). BYOD is forecasted to spawn a $181.39 billion industry by 2017 
(MarketsandMarkets, 2012). Figure 1 depicts the mobile phone market trends in the U.S. through 
the second quarter of 2012. 
 
Figure 1. Mobile Phone Trends in the U.S.1 
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Given the mobile device trends in government and industry, the challenge of securing 
smartphones on an enterprise has emerged. Most vendors do not design smartphones primarily for 
business use. Instead, their efforts focus on consumers who will utilize their phones as personal 
devices. RIM is an exception, as corporate customers can maintain a BlackBerry Enterprise 
Server for device management. Unlike RIM, Android device vendors do not ship with built-in 
mobile device management (MDM) systems. Third-party MDM is a quickly evolving field that 
addresses the security gaps left by the smartphone industry. Within the next five years, 65% of all 
enterprises are expected to adopt third-party MDM (Pettey, 2012). BYOD increases the need for 
MDM systems due to the inherent risks involved with allowing untrusted devices on an 
enterprise; organizations need strict enforcement of mobile device security policies to mitigate the 
BYOD risks. 
 
Research on several leading MDM products revealed a general lack of features that perform 
automated collections of forensic data from Android devices at the enterprise level. The 
availability of this data would aid common security programs found within organizations 
including incident response, security auditing, proactive security monitoring, and forensic 
investigations. According to the 2010/2011 Computer Security Institute Computer Crime and 
Security Survey, 61.5% of respondents from various companies reported that internal audits were 
performed within their organizations as a security mechanism. Additionally, 44% reported that 
data-loss prevention and user-content monitoring programs were in place (Richardson, 2010). 
These statistics show that many organizations are aware of insider threat enterprise risks and have 
taken steps to mitigate them; however, given the lack of technology to monitor Android 
smartphones, many actions performed on these devices are not covered. The lack of monitoring 
options, coupled with the high impact that continuously collected smartphone data can have on 
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internal investigations, led to the proposal and development of a prototype solution named 
DroidWatch, which is the subject of this thesis. 
 
2 Scope 
This work focuses on the design and implementation of an Android application (further known as 
“app”) that automates the collection of useful data for internal investigations including (but not 
limited to) policy violations, intellectual property theft, misuse, embezzlement, sabotage, and 
espionage. Data was collected from a Samsung Galaxy S II Epic 4G Touch Android smartphone 
running Gingerbread 2.3.6. It was then sent to a central server running Ubuntu 12.04, PHP 5.3.10, 
MySQL 5.5.28, Apache 2.2.22, and Splunk 5.0.1. Capabilities such as anti-virus, root detection, 
and protections against the app’s termination or uninstallation are necessary for system and 
enterprise security, but are out of scope for this research. All data collected by the implemented 
app will occur with user consent by means of a banner (henceforth referred to as “user consent 
banner”) similar to those commonly found on corporate or government networks. Data will not be 
obtained with root privileges or exploitation of the Android architecture. References made to 




The following subsections discuss the basics of the Android Framework (Section 3.1), 
fundamental app components (Section 3.2), Android app security model (Section 3.3), 
implications of rooting a device (Section 3.4), handling of mobile devices in current 
investigations (Section 3.5), and privacy concerns related to smartphones (Section 3.6). 
 
4 
3.1 Android Framework 
The Android System Architecture Framework (see Figure 2) describes the interaction of 
underlying Android device components in four distinct layers: Applications, Application 
Framework, Libraries, and the Linux Kernel. Each layer relies on the next layer to function 
properly. 
 
Figure 2. Android System Architecture Framework2 
 
Figure 3 illustrates a specific implementation of the Android System Architecture Framework. 
For an app to receive a new set of Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates from an Android 
device, it must call the LocationManager Java class from the Application Framework Layer, 
which uses the Java Native Interface to interact with the libgps.so C library, which finally 
calls the appropriate kernel driver to get the device’s current location (Townsend, 2010). 
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Figure 3. Obtaining GPS Coordinates Through the Android Framework 
 
3.2 Key Application Components 
Apps use four key Android framework components: activities, services, content providers, and 
broadcast receivers. Each app component, described in the sections that follow, serves a distinct 
and useful purpose. 
 
3.2.1 Android Activities 
According to Google’s official documentation, activities are individual screens that implement a 
user interface. They display information, prompt user interaction, and start other activities within 
apps (Google, n.d.-b). In DroidWatch, activities are rarely used; most of the work happens in the 
background so as to not impact the overall user experience. Activities are only viewable in the 




3.2.2 Android Services 
Services are long-running background operations requiring no user interaction. Other application 
components, such as activities, can launch services and have them persist even when other apps 
and services are running (Google, n.d.-b). DroidWatch relies on a service that constantly runs to 
spawn data collections and transfers. 
 
                                                     
3
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3.2.3 Android Content Providers 
Content providers are app components that manage the access and sharing of application data. 
Apps interface with content providers through mechanisms called content resolvers, which 
communicate with content providers through predefined uniform resource identifiers (URIs). 
Permission to access a content provider’s data is verified upon the initial registration of a content 
resolver and during each query performed through it (Google, n.d.-b). DroidWatch uses content 
providers in two ways: 
1. Reading data stored within other applications (e.g., call logs and contacts) 
2. Reading and writing data stored within the DroidWatch app. 
 
3.2.4 Android Broadcast Receivers 
Broadcast receivers are app components that handle and respond to broadcast system events on an 
Android device. They are intended to perform a minimal amount of work and often serve as 
gateways to the other app components (Google, n.d.-b). They are implemented into DroidWatch 
to detect events such as incoming short message service (SMS) messages and app installs. 
 
3.3 Android Application Security 
Google’s security model for Android apps involves the declaration of permissions within an app’s 
AndroidManifest.xml file (further known as an “AndroidManifest”). By default, an app 
with no requested permissions cannot “perform any operations that would adversely impact other 
applications, the operating system, or the user” (Google, n.d.-e). This means that an app cannot 
access the private data of other apps, use network services, write to the internal/external memory, 
or perform other basic functions. A newly downloaded app must present its declared permissions 
to the user prior to installation. The AndroidManifest for DroidWatch is provided in Appendix A. 
 
7 
Once an app’s permissions have been presented, a user can assess the inherent risks of installing 
it. If consent is not granted, the app is not installed. If the user accepts the risks, an app becomes 
enabled to send and receive information to the newly allowed areas of a phone through transfer 
mechanisms called intents. Intents are the only legitimate way of accessing data inside another 
app without elevated or “root” privileges since all apps are sandboxed and run separately under 
different user IDs. 
 
Android device users are subject to the same security and permissions as apps and cannot 
navigate into an app’s private folder directly by default. For example, to access the 
/data/data/com.droidwatch/database directory of the DroidWatch app, a user must 
have the DroidWatch app’s user ID or root privileges, which is not possible under normal 
circumstances. Users do, however, have the ability to uninstall apps such as DroidWatch 
(methods to prevent this are out of scope for this research), thus erasing any privately stored data 
within the app.  
 
3.4 Rooting: Advantages and Disadvantages 
Rooting enables users to perform higher privileged functions on a device that ordinarily are not 
possible under normal privileges and can be used for legitimate or illegitimate purposes. 
Individuals with malicious intentions may want to circumvent restrictions imposed by carriers, 
policies, or applications to tamper with an app like DroidWatch or its underlying data. While 
DroidWatch is susceptible to attacks by root users, the detection and prevention of root tampering 
is out of scope for this research. In an enterprise setting, any mobile device with root privileges 
can be deemed a threat because of its ability to bypass an organization’s security controls 
(Souppaya & Scarfone, 2012). 
 
8 
Root access can be used legitimately by forensic investigators to extract data from a device. In 
addition, security apps may use root privileges to gain access to unwatched parts of a phone. 
However, rooting should be avoided whenever possible. The rooting process typically exploits a 
security flaw in a specific device or operating system version and may lead to further security 
vulnerabilities. Rooting also alters portions of a device (an action that is contradictory to forensic 
practices); nonetheless, rooting may be unavoidable depending on the circumstances and types of 
data needed (Vidas, Zhang, & Christin, 2011). While root access may increase the number of 
features for an app like DroidWatch, the consequences can undermine the system’s security and 
put the smartphone provider’s warranty at risk. 
 
3.5 Smartphone Investigations 
Law enforcement and government agencies are the primary players in the mobile security field, 
as they are authorized to investigate crimes and secure sensitive government information. 
Corporations are also very interested in mobile security to protect themselves from commercial 
espionage, financial theft, and intellectual property theft. Private interests involving divorce 
settlements, custody battles, estate disputes, etc. also gain from advances in the field (Hoog, 
2011).  
 
Consequently, the types of investigations that would benefit from user data collections and 
monitoring of smartphones are law enforcement investigations, internal investigations, and 
private investigations. Law enforcement investigations are conducted by government personnel 
and often involve a crime scene, rigid forensic device acquisition and preservation procedures, 
and strict evidence handling through chain-of-custody so that any results gleaned from analysis 
hold up in court. Private investigations are conducted by licensed private investigators, suspicious 
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spouses or parents, hackers, etc. and often involve financial, legal, or personal matters (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). 
 
This research focuses on internal investigations performed by personnel, contracted or otherwise, 
within an organization (e.g., incident responders, security auditors, analysts performing proactive 
monitoring, etc.) to investigate potential policy violations, intellectual property theft, misuse, 
embezzlement, sabotage, espionage, and other inquiries or allegations. Internal investigators are 
not required to conform to the strict forensic acquisition and preservation procedures of law 
enforcement investigations but typically try to adhere to commonly practiced forensic techniques 
and rules. Some U.S. states have or are considering legislation that further requires computer 
forensic examiners and incident responders be licensed to ensure that these individuals have 
received proper training (Garnett, 2010). 
 
To obtain valuable smartphone data for internal investigations, physical access to a device is 
typically required. An exception to this is EnCase Enterprise,
4
 which as of October 2012 performs 
remote forensic imaging of Android devices over a network. Some MDMs can also perform 
limited monitoring (specific products are covered in Section 4.1). Assuming that a mobile device 
is physically retrieved, investigators can use a variety of tools to take logical or physical 
snapshots of a device’s current state. Logical snapshots contain a dump of records or files, while 
physical snapshots are bit-by-bit copies of sectors or pages (Garfinkel, 2011). The following tools 
are available to capture information from Android smartphones (Hoog, 2011): 
                                                     
4
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http://www.guidancesoftware.com/encase-enterprise.htm. 
10 




 Cellebrite UFED 
 EnCase Neutrino 
 Micro Systemation XRY 
 Paraben Device Seizure 
 AccessData MPE+.
 
Some tools listed above are handheld hardware devices and others are software products; 
however, all work through a universal serial bus (USB) connection and require physical access to 
the smartphone to function. In addition, many of the tools require root access (Valle, 2013). 
Related work has found that when two distinct tools target and output the same data set, the 
results are slightly different because of the varying acquisition techniques employed in each tool 
(Kovacik & O’Day, 2010; Lessard & Kessler, 2010). For example, a tool may find a few text 
messages not found by another. 
 
The types of smartphone content that are valuable to investigations are found in the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics. These data sets 
include (Jansen & Ayers, 2007): 
 Subscriber and equipment identifiers 
 Date/time, language, and other settings 
 Phonebook information 
 Appointment calendar information 
 Text messages 
 Dialed, incoming, and missed call logs 
 Email 
 Photos 
 Audio and video recordings 
 Multi-media messages 
 Instant messaging and Web browsing 




Many of these data sets are incorporated into DroidWatch and are detailed in Section 5.2.8. 
 
3.6 Privacy Concerns 
As more data is generated and stored on smartphones, more privacy concerns will emerge. In 
June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in City of Ontario v. Quon that an audit performed on a 
government-owned, alphanumeric pager did not violate the Fourth Amendment, which protects 
against unreasonable search and seizure in the U.S. The pager was operated by Jeff Quon, a 
member of the Ontario, California police department’s Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
team. His device exceeded the allotted monthly character limits, causing surcharges to be 
incurred by the city, which Quon reimbursed. When his supervisor reviewed the audit of Quon’s 
device, Quon was allegedly reprimanded for sending a large quantity of non-work related text 
messages, some of which were sexually explicit. Quon argued that his rights were violated since 
he paid the incurred surcharges (U.S. Supreme Court, 2010). The Court’s opinion stated that this 
verdict was not meant to be broad; however, there are potential implications to BYOD policies 
since it can be construed that Quon’s mobile device, although provided by his employer, was 
partially his since he paid for some of the charges. This interpretation may lead organizations to 
install monitoring apps like DroidWatch on all enterprise smartphones, including those that are 
personally owned. 
 
Mobile phone privacy was discussed in the case of Fannie Garcia, a former police dispatcher for 
the city of Laredo, Texas. Garcia was fired after a coworker’s wife discovered inappropriate 
content on Garcia’s personal smartphone and reported it to supervisory personnel. The phone was 
removed from an unlocked storage locker where Garcia worked without Garcia’s permission. The 
Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s ruling that Garcia’s phone content 
was not protected under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and, as a result, upheld her 
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dismissal (U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, 2012). The ruling means that the SCA does not 
protect data stored on a smartphone, because the data is not stored within a “facility through 
which wire and electronic communications are kept in temporary storage, or as back-up storage.” 
Therefore, data collected through an app like DroidWatch may not be protected by the SCA. 
 
Another case concerning mobile phone privacy is that of the California-based company Carrier 
IQ
5
 and its software customers (Apple, HTC, Samsung, Motorola, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile). 
These companies were sued in 2011 for violating the Federal Wiretap Act. There were allegations 
that the Carrier IQ software spied on more than 150 million smartphone users across the U.S. The 
defendant companies countered that the software was meant for tracking network health issues, 
such as dropped calls, and did not take advantage of software bugs that could allow content 
tracking for email and text messages. Several federal and state court cases involving Carrier IQ’s 
software are still pending (Davis, 2012; Epstein, 2011). To avoid the legal and spyware issues 
referenced in the Carrier IQ case, DroidWatch is careful to ensure that users are aware that they 
are operating in a monitored environment. 
 
U.S. v Ziegler ruled that an organization has a right to monitor its own equipment, on which 
employees have little to no expectation of privacy. One key factor in the ruling was that Jeffrey 
Ziegler knew of his company’s policy stating that the company’s computers were subject to 
monitoring (U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 2007). Organizations often inform users of 
monitoring policies through the display of network banners;
6
 however, network banners were not 
specifically referenced in U.S. v. Ziegler. Nonetheless, the court found that the policy handbook 
                                                     
5
 More information about Carrier IQ can be retrieved from http://www.carrieriq.com/. 
6
 For more information about network banners, Department of Justice guidelines are available and can be 
retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
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presented to new hires at Ziegler’s company, coupled with verbal instructions from management, 
served as a sufficient warning that employees’ computer actions were monitored.  
 
DroidWatch displays a user consent banner during a phone’s boot process to inform users of 
privacy expectations and to garner their consent (more details on the consent banner’s 
implementation can be found in Section 5.2.2). This helps the app avoid a spyware classification 
and acts as a deterrent for system misuse. Previous work reveals that awareness of computer 
monitoring “has a significant effect on users’ perceived certainty and severity of sanctions,” 
which provides empirical evidence that the display of user consent banners deter misuse (D'Arcy, 
Hovav, & Galletta, 2009). 
 
4 Related Work 
The following subsections discuss several products and efforts that complement or have 
otherwise influenced this research. Commercially available products are discussed in Section 4.1 
and academic efforts are described in Section 4.2 . 
 
4.1 Commercial Products 
Third-party MDM products increase the overall security of an enterprise that has mobile devices; 
however, most MDMs do not include in-depth user monitoring capabilities. Instead, they focus on 
the following areas (National Security Agency, 2012):  
 Data-at-rest protection 
 Remote wipe 
 Application policies 
 Enterprise app deployment 
 Version reporting 
 Detection of user-initiated platform 
modification 
 
 Virtual private network 
14 
 Wi-Fi and cellular network restrictions 
 Certificate trust management 
 USB Connection policy
 
Some leading MDM offerings,
7
 such as Zenprise, AirWatch, and MobileIron, offer limited 
monitoring capabilities (e.g., GPS tracking and SMS monitoring), but fail to collect other 
available data sets that are helpful to incident responders, security auditors, proactive security 
analysts, and other internal investigators. Of the researched MDM products, Juniper’s Junos Pulse 
Mobile Security Suite (version 3.0R3) offers the most user monitoring capabilities and was 
evaluated as part of this research effort. Findings show that the product collects and monitors 
roughly 50% of the data sets covered in DroidWatch; however, the data must be stored and 
hosted by Juniper-controlled systems. This may preclude an organization’s requirement to store 
its audit data internally. Refer to Appendix B for a full evaluation. 
 
Specialized apps outside the MDM realm, such as Lookout,
8
 are not designed for enterprise use 
and typically target a limited number of data sets on a phone. Other commercially available 
products, such as personal “spy” apps
9
 (e.g., Mobistealth, StealthGenie, FlexiSpy, and Mobile 
Spy), collect many of the same data sets as DroidWatch, but have limiting factors such as 
requirements for elevated privileges and a lack of enterprise storage and analysis capabilities. 
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 More information about Lookout can be retrieved from https://www.lookout.com. 
9






They are also often classified as spyware because they collect personal information without 
knowledge of the user (Juniper Networks, 2012; TechGuy, 2009). 
 
Remote enterprise forensic collection tools also seek to increase enterprise security. Google 
Rapid Response (GRR), an open-source project introduced at the 2011 Digital Forensics 
Research Workshop (DFRWS), allows forensic investigators and incident responders to locate 
and forensically acquire evidence from a large number of machines over a network (Cohen, 
Bilby, & Caronni, 2011). Commercially available solutions similar to GRR are EnCase 
Enterprise, AccessData Enterprise, F-Response Enterprise Edition, and Mandiant Intelligent 
Response, among others.
10
 EnCase Enterprise works on Android smartphones, while the others do 
not. However, all the aforementioned remote forensic tools differ from DroidWatch because they 
do not continuously collect and store data. Instead, they take one-time snapshots of data when 
instructed by an investigator. Code from DroidWatch could be used to help extend the 
capabilities of these tools to collect data from Android devices. 
 
4.2 Academic Work 
Several scholarly efforts have shaped this research effort. One system, proposed by Xinfang Lee 
et al., uses an Android app located on a Secure Digital Card (SDCard) to extract data quickly 
from a smartphone onto the same SDCard using the Android Application Programming Interface 
(API). This fundamental application-level approach to collecting data is similar to DroidWatch, 
except their system does not monitor a device continuously. The work by Lee, Yang, Chen, and 
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Wu helped highlight various data sets that can be obtained without root privileges (2009). 
AFLogical, released as an open-source product by viaForensics, takes a similar approach. It uses 
a specialized SDCard and expands on the number of retrieved data sets (Hoog, 2010). Follow-on 
work that substituted cloud computing for the SDCards was proposed by Chung-Huang Yang and 
Yen-Ting Lai (2012). Unlike DroidWatch, the aforementioned research efforts require physical 
access and take one-time snapshots of data from an Android smartphone. 
 
Related work by Angel Villan and Josep Esteve described a native Android app that performs 
real-time monitoring, similar to virtual network computing (VNC), on a smartphone without root 
privileges (Villan & Esteve, 2011). Their research involved streaming a user’s screen to a remote 
location for usability purposes (i.e., for use at corporate help desks). The ability to watch a user’s 
screen could complement the features of DroidWatch in the future. 
 
Research presented by Clay Shields et al. introduced a forensic acquisition and monitoring system 
named Proactive Object Fingerprinting and Storage (PROOFS), the first system to perform true 
forensic acquisitions over a network in a continuous, proactive manner using a novel object 
fingerprinting approach (Shields, Frieder, & Maloof, 2011). While PROOFS does not operate on 
Android smartphones, it does highlight the criteria required for a monitoring tool to be considered 
forensically sound. Future work on DroidWatch includes the incorporation of some of these 
criteria discussed in their research. 
 
Previous anti-forensics work on the Android platform was instrumental in evaluating how 
DroidWatch could be compromised or thwarted. Several general anti-forensic concepts, such as 
data hiding and destruction, were ported to Android and discussed by Alessandro Distefano et al. 
(Distefano, Me, & Pace, 2010). The work served as a guide during the assessment of anti-forensic 
techniques to DroidWatch app components (Section 5.4). Research presented at the 45th Hawaii 
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International Conference on System Sciences detailed another anti-forensics concept involving 
the real-time detection of a forensics tool on an Android smartphone (Azadegan, Yu, Liu, Sistani, 





DroidWatch is an automated system prototype composed of an Android application and an 
enterprise server. After obtaining user consent, the app continuously collects, stores, and transfers 
forensically valuable Android data to a Web server without root privileges. The following 
subsections discuss the details of DroidWatch’s design and implementation, the analysis and 
evaluation of its results, and the potential anti-forensic opportunities available in the app. 
 
5.2 Design and Implementation 
5.2.1 System Architecture 
DroidWatch’s system architecture is described in Figure 4. Each descending layer represents a 
higher level of abstraction. Various collection, storage, and transfer components are handled by a 
service that facilitates actions within the app and the enterprise server. The individual components 
labeled within the diagram are explained throughout the design subsections. 
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Figure 4. DroidWatch System Architecture 
 
5.2.2 User Consent to Monitoring 
The DroidWatch app is dependent upon a user consent banner (see Figure 5) that appears when 
the app is started during the phone’s boot process or launched manually through the Android app 
menu. Upon acceptance of its terms and conditions, which are configurable prior to the app’s 
installation in the strings.xml file, a long-running service is launched to perform the data 
collection, storage, and transfer components of the system architecture. The option to reject the 
user consent terms is also presented for the purposes of this research, although organizations may 
wish to omit this option in real deployments. Rejecting or closing the user consent banner causes 
the DroidWatch service not to run. The banner is implemented using an activity that is registered 
in the AndroidManifest to receive the android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED 
broadcast to ensure its display during the boot process. 
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Figure 5. User Consent Banner 
 
5.2.3 Data Collection Components 
The DroidWatch app utilizes several Android app components to perform its data monitoring and 
collection. These components (further known as “data collection components”) are content 
observers, broadcast receivers, and alarms. 
 
 Content Observers 5.2.3.1
Content observers are mechanisms that, when associated with content providers, receive 
notifications when a targeted data set’s underlying SQLite database content is modified (Google, 
n.d.-d). However, these real-time notifications do not contain information about what changed. 
To gain meaningful data from content observers, additional processes must be in place to 
determine the altered content. Content observers are prone to false positive and duplication issues 
since any changes to a data set’s underlying database, even on data not collected, can trigger 
notifications. 
 
 Broadcast Receivers 5.2.3.2
Broadcast receivers handle and respond to system-wide broadcast messages. Like content 
observers, they involve real-time notifications that may lack content details; however, they are 
not generally prone to false positive or duplication issues because of their implementation details. 
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Broadcast receivers react to atomic events and have ten seconds to perform their functions before 
they are terminated by the Android operating system (Google, n.d.-c). 
 
 Alarms 5.2.3.3
Alarms are scheduled operations configured in DroidWatch to periodically query content 
providers or directly call static Java methods to pull in new data. They are reliable, but only run at 
designated times. Data that is deleted or modified between collection runs may not be captured in 
its original form, if at all. In addition, other processes must be in place to ensure that duplicate 
events from data sets are not added to the local SQLite database (i.e., an alarm that runs twice 
over the same data set may detect the same event both times). 
 
5.2.4 Design Strategy 
To simplify the development process of an app that performs monitoring through continuous or 
periodic data collections, a general design strategy for prioritizing data collection components 
was applied throughout the development of DroidWatch, as presented below. 
 
Broadcast Receivers  Content Observers  Alarms 
 
The strategy is based on the aforementioned pros and cons (refer to Section 5.2.3) and the relative 
ease of implementation. First, data sets should be analyzed to determine if they generate system 
broadcasts. If they do, broadcast receivers should be considered as the collection component. If 
broadcasts are not available, consider content observers for implementation. Alarms should be 




5.2.5 Local Storage 
All collected data is stored temporarily in a local SQLite database on the phone and is configured 
to be accessible to the DroidWatch app only. Standard Structured Query Language (SQL) 
database functions such as selections, insertions, and deletions are handled by a custom-
developed DroidWatch content provider. Using a content provider instead of direct SQLite 
database calls allows each of DroidWatch’s collections to perform data storage functions in a 
thread-safe and structured manner. 
 
A scheduled alarm periodically transfers the local SQLite database file over hypertext transfer 
protocol secure (HTTPS) POST to the enterprise server for processing. The transfer process is 
designed to run in the background with minimal impact on a user’s experience, helped by the 
relatively small size (50-100 kilobytes) of the database file. The file size is minimized by clearing 
events dated prior to the start time of a successful transfer event. In addition, the clearing 
mechanism lessens the risk of data loss should the phone be compromised. 
 
5.2.6 Enterprise Server 
The enterprise server prototype, to which the collected data flows, is an Ubuntu Linux virtual 
machine on a local, private network running Apache, PHP: Hypertext Processor (PHP), MySQL, 
and Splunk. Apache was configured with a self-signed secure socket layer (SSL) certificate, 
which was included as an asset file within the DroidWatch app. This allows data to be transferred 
over an HTTPS connection. PHP code handles the secure POST uploads, extracts the events from 
the uploaded SQLite file, and stores them in an enterprise MySQL database. Note that the PHP 
code used on the server is available in Appendix C. Splunk periodically pulls data from the 
MySQL database and makes the events available in its interface for analysis and reporting. 
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5.2.7 Data Process Flow 
The data process flow within the DroidWatch app is depicted in Figure 6. Data collection and 
storage is a continuous process, with transfers scheduled every two hours by default (this value is 
configurable). Upon a successful transfer to the enterprise server, events dated prior to the 
transfer are wiped from the local phone database. File transfer attempts that fail are logged in the 
database and do not result in the wiping of any events. 
 
Figure 6. Data Process Flow Diagram 
 
5.2.8 Data Sets 
Table 1 lists the targeted data sets collected for this thesis. Each data set can be configured 
through droidwatch.properties, an asset file included within the app that allows for the 
adjustment of collection intervals (i.e., how long the system waits between collections). 
Organizations can choose to omit a data set collection by setting its interval value to zero. Fifteen 
unique data sets could be accessed; two data sets—emails and account passwords—were 
explored, but not used (as explained below). 
 
Mechanisms to access data within the email app are not part of the standard Android Software 
Development Kit (SDK) and are not documented in the API (CommonsWare, 2010). 
Furthermore, the email app is restricted by a signatureOrSystem permission, which 
prohibits third-party apps from accessing its private data (Android Open Source Project, 2008). 
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Access to account passwords is protected by similar protection schemes; the calling app must 
declare the android.permssion.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS permission in the 
AndroidManifest and have its user identification (ID) match that of the requested account 
(Google, n.d.-a). 
 
The table shows some data sets collected using more than one collection component. For 
example, Multimedia Message Service (MMS) messages are detected by using a broadcast 
receiver and an alarm; the component used depends on the message direction. Data set details are 
provided in the following subsections. 
Table 1. Design of Data Set Collections 
Data Set 
Collection Component Used 
BroadcastReceiver ContentObserver Alarm 
App Installs / Removals    
Browser Navigation History    
Browser Searches    
Calendar Events    
Call Logs (Incoming / Outgoing / Missed)    
Contacts Added    
Device Accounts*    
Device ID (e.g., IMEI, MEID, ESN)    
GPS Location    
Location Settings (e.g., GPS turned off)    
MMS (Incoming / Outgoing)    
Pictures Added    
Screen Lock Status (e.g., Unlocked)    
SMS (Incoming / Outgoing)    
Third-Party App Logs (Logcat)    
*Device account information is collected, but not through any of the listed collection components. 
Instead, accounts are directly retrieved through the Android API when the DroidWatch service 
starts. 
 
 App Installs and Removals 5.2.8.1
When an app is installed or removed, a system-wide broadcast is sent across an Android phone. 
Apps are not required to declare permissions in the AndroidManifest to receive this broadcast, 
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although they must register a broadcast receiver and include intent-filters to handle the 
Intent.PACKAGE_ADDED and Intent.PACKAGE_REMOVED events. Additional 
information, including the name of the involved package, is extracted from the intents and logged 
accordingly. 
 
 Browser Navigation History 5.2.8.2
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) of websites accessed through the built-in Android Web 
browser are collected through an alarm. While a content observer is available to detect browser 
changes instantaneously, it is a noisy option, as change notifications are triggered constantly—
even when the browser is closed. To avoid battery and performance degradation, an alarm is 
scheduled and configured to perform a query on the 
android.provider.Browser.BOOKMARKS_URI content provider URI every six hours by 
default. This content provider contains options to access a browser’s visited URL history, counts 
of each visited URL, and a list of bookmarked websites; however, this research only focuses on 
the visited URL history and access dates. To gain access to the browser history data, the 
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS permission must 
be included in the AndroidManifest. To mitigate duplication issues that occur with data retrieved 
through alarms, checks are made on the local DroidWatch database to ensure that an inserted 
event is unique. 
 
 Browser Searches 5.2.8.3
Browser searches are terms or incomplete website addresses entered into the URL bar of the 
built-in Web browser. These searches are collected by DroidWatch through an alarm. A content 
observer is not available for this data set; therefore, the underlying data must be retrieved through 
a scheduled process. Searches are configured to be accessed through the 
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com.android.provider.Browser.SEARCHES_URI content provider URI every six 
hours by default and are inserted into the DroidWatch database if they are unique events. Access 
to the content requires the same permission as browser URL collections: 
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS. 
 
 Calendar Events 5.2.8.4
Official support to access calendar events was included with the Android release of Ice Cream 
Sandwich and API level 14 (Bray, 2011). However, because the phone used in this research runs 
the older Gingerbread operating system, undocumented parts of the Android framework API are 
used to retrieve these events and may not work in other Android phones or versions.
11
 The alarm 
is configured to scan the content://com.android.calendar/event_entities 
content provider URI for new events every twelve hours by default. Since the content provider 
does not allow access to any fields that indicate when a calendar event is added to a device, a 
separate calendar database table is created and maintained. Upon the installation and first 
execution of DroidWatch, the table is populated with current calendar events and marked with the 
current timestamp. During periodic scans of the built-in Android calendar, DroidWatch checks 
each entry against its internal calendar table and adds the event if it is new. While additional data 
such as location, author, and event details are available through the content provider, this research 
focuses on event dates and titles. Access to perform these actions on the calendar data set requires 
the android.permission.READ_CALENDAR permission be declared in the 
AndroidManifest. 
 
                                                     
11
 Undocumented content provider URIs were identified through various online Android-related forums and 
confirmed by their presence in the source code of the Android Open Source Project. 
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 Call Logs 5.2.8.5
Call details are retrievable using a variety of methods. A broadcast receiver can be used, but 
notifications are only triggered when the phone changes its state (e.g., idle, ringing, or “off the 
hook”). In the rare instance of a missed call appearing without the phone having rung, the event 
may not send a system broadcast, thus resulting in data loss. To ensure the capture of all new 
phone calls, a content observer is implemented on the 
android.provider.CallLog.Calls.CONTENT_URI content provider URI. This URI 
enables the detection of incoming, outgoing, and missed calls, as well as the external phone 
number, contact name, duration, and start date of the call. Note that this research discovered 
false-positive issues with this content observer. As users accessed portions of their contacts list 
(without calling anyone), change notifications were sent; however, because the number of false 
positives was manageable, checks were implemented to ensure that only new phone call events 
are inserted into the local DroidWatch database. Access to the logged phone content requires the 
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS permission be added to the AndroidManifest. 
 
 Contacts Added 5.2.8.6
Contact information can be monitored for changes on an Android phone through a content 
observer; however, there are no indications of specific changes. Furthermore, the dates that 
contacts are added to a phone are not available through the content provider URI, 
android.provider.ContactsContract.CommonDataKinds.Phone.CONTENT_U
RI. To detect the addition of a contact, a separate contacts table in the local DroidWatch database 
is maintained. During the app’s collection process, a check is performed to verify if the 
DroidWatch’s contacts database has been populated. If not, the phone’s current contact list is 
copied with the current timestamp inserted as each entry’s “date added.” Following this, any 
changes noted by the content observer are compared against DroidWatch’s list. If a contact is not 
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recognized, the name, phone number, and current date/time are inserted in the local database as a 
new event and new contact in each respective table. The same permission required for monitoring 
the call log, android.permission.READ_CONTACTS, is required for contact monitoring in 
DroidWatch. 
  
 Device Accounts 5.2.8.7
Accounts associated with a device are not collected through typical collection components. 
Instead, this data is gathered as part of the app launching process and assumes that a user has set 
up the Android device to sync with a personal account (e.g., Gmail or Skype). The account names 
are retrieved by looping through an array of Account objects through the Android API’s 
AccountManager.get().getAccounts() method. The only requirement to use this 
method is to declare the android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS permission in the 
AndroidManifest. 
 
 Device ID 5.2.8.8
A device ID is a unique identifier that differentiates the Android phone from other phones on an 
enterprise. In DroidWatch, the device ID is collected at the start of every scheduled transfer 
process (every two hours by default). In addition, it is included in the data received by the 
enterprise server. The app uses an alarm that calls the getDeviceId() method from the 
Android API’s TelephonyManager class to directly access a phone’s device ID. According to 
the Android Developer Documentation, a device ID is one of the following types of identifiers: 
 International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
 Electronic Serial Number (ESN) 
 Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID). 
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An IMEI is returned for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) phones, while an 
ESN or MEID is returned for Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) phones (Google, n.d.-f). 
The device used in this research returns an MEID, since Sprint (who use CDMA) is the provider 
of the test phone. The android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE permission must be 
declared in the AndroidManifest for an app to extract the device ID. 
 
 GPS Location 5.2.8.9
The phone’s GPS location is retrieved through the LocationManager class in the Android 
API. The class supports a requestLocationUpdates()method, which takes a minimum 
time interval as an argument to stagger the connection requests. Ideally, this is how GPS 
collections should be performed; however, faults in this method ignore the specified minimum 
time interval on devices running Gingerbread and Ice Cream Sandwich. In addition, it 
continuously makes requests for GPS coordinates, quickly draining the battery and degrading the 
device performance. This issue was allegedly resolved with the release of the Android’s Jelly 
Bean operating system (Barbeau, 2012). To mitigate the issue for this research, the 
getLastKnownLocation()method was used through an alarm scheduled to execute once 
every hour by default. This method relies on active GPS usage prior to collection and does not 
activate the location provider, thus saving the battery life of a device. Access to the GPS provider 
requires that the android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission be 
declared in the AndroidManifest. Other location permissions, such as 
android.permissions.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, are optional and may save 
additional battery life but result in less accurate location reporting. 
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 Location Provider Settings Changes 5.2.8.10
Android phones consist of a GPS location provider and a network location provider. The GPS 
provider retrieves location updates through satellites, while the network provider gets a current 
set of coordinates through Wi-Fi access points and cell towers. When the phone’s settings are 
manually adjusted to enable or disable these providers, a system broadcast is generated. In 
DroidWatch, a broadcast receiver is established with an intent-filter to handle the 
LocationManager.PROVIDERS_CHANGED_ACTION intent. The broadcast does not 
contain information that indicates which provider changed; therefore, a separate process must 
query the state of each provider on each change notification. No permissions are required in the 
AndroidManifest to access this information. 
 
 Multimedia Message Service 5.2.8.11
The detection and extraction of new MMS messages are a challenge for Android apps that 
attempt to retrieve this information. A system broadcast is delivered for incoming MMS 
messages, but not for outgoing messages. In addition, unlike the broadcast seen for app installs 
and removals, no information contained in the incoming MMS broadcasts can be extracted to 
determine the event content.  
 
Apps that declare broadcast receivers and include intent-filters to handle the 
android.provider.Telephony.MMS_RECEIVED and 
android.provider.Telephony.WAP_PUSH intents can be notified of incoming MMS 
messages. When capturing outgoing MMS, a content observer initially was registered on the 
undocumented content://mms content provider URI, which resulted in app crashes upon any 
detected MMS activity. Furthermore, it was discovered that the MMS content observer triggered 
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during the creation of a new MMS message, not when a message was sent; therefore, an alarm 
was scheduled to retrieve the history of outgoing MMS messages once every hour. 
 
It is possible to extract the contact’s address (phone number or email address) and name, message 
timestamp, subject, filename of the picture, and whether text was included with the message (not 
the message text itself). These fields can be accessed through more undocumented parts of the 
Android SDK, although Google discourages this for stability reasons. Undocumented API 
methods are likely to change in future official Android releases; if this happens, an app like 
DroidWatch may crash (Bray, 2011). 
 
As part of this research, undocumented areas of the Android SDK are explored to discover MMS 
message content for incoming and outgoing messages.
12
 The content://mms content provider 
URI contains the message ID, direction, date, conversation thread ID, and subject fields. The 
content://mms/part content provider URI contains the filename of the picture and the text 
field. If the text field is null, no text is included with the MMS message. If the field is blank, there 
is associated text; however, no mechanisms to access the text content were found in the Android 
SDK to work on the test phone. The content://mms-sms/conversations URI is used 
to find a contact’s address (phone number or email address) through a conversation thread ID; 
however, the presence of an address is largely inconsistent. Conversation threads that last 
received an incoming SMS or MMS message appear to display the recorded address, while the 
address field is empty. To mitigate this, an additional check of the undocumented 
content://sms content provider URI is performed to obtain the conversation thread’s 
address, which is a more reliable method of retrieving addresses. The contact name can then be 
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associated with the address through methods previously explained in “Contacts Added” (see 
Section 5.2.8.6). 
 
Duplicate message checks are performed for incoming and outgoing MMS messages. This 
ensures that the local database only contains one copy of the message. The permissions required 




 Pictures Added 5.2.8.12
Photos taken while using an Android smartphone’s camera result in system broadcast events, but 
pictures added through alternate methods (e.g., download, manual insertion) do not. To achieve 
wider image monitoring capabilities, a content observer is used instead of a broadcast receiver. 
The content observer is registered on the built-in Android Gallery’s content URI, 
android.provider.MediaStore.Images.Media.EXTERNAL_CONTENT_URI. 
Resulting change notifications, concurrent with other collections retrieved using content 
observers, do not include information about changes in the Gallery. When a change notification 
triggers, additional checks in DroidWatch are performed to see if the value in the content 
provider’s “date_added” field contains a timestamp that falls within the last five seconds, thus 
indicating a new picture. Other fields available through the content provider URI are “latitude,” 
“longitude,” and “mime_type,” but this research only focuses on the name and date of each image 
detected. New events are also checked against the local database to ensure that they are not 
duplicates. This collection requires no additional permissions in the AndroidManifest to gain read 
access to the content. 
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 Screen Lock Status 5.2.8.13
System-wide broadcasts are sent when an Android phone’s screen status changes (e.g., unlocked, 
locked, or off states). To capture these broadcasts, a broadcast receiver must be set up with intent-
filters that handle the Intent.ACTION_USER_PRESENT, Intent.ACTION_SCREEN_ON, 
and Intent.ACTION_SCREEN_OFF intents. No additional permissions are required in the 
Android manifest to access this information. 
 
 Short Message Service 5.2.8.14
Broadcast receivers are configured to retrieve incoming SMS messages but are not applicable for 
outgoing messages, which are captured through a content observer registered on the 
undocumented content://sms content provider URI from the Android SDK. The incoming 
broadcasts contain extra information in their intents, including the sender’s address, date, and 
body. The address can then be associated with a contact name through methods similar to the 
“Contacts Added” collection. The aforementioned fields are similarly retrieved through the 
content provider for outgoing messages.  
 
In the case of outgoing SMS, change notifications are generated through the content observer for 
each step of the transmittal process (i.e., messages moving from “draft” to “pending” to “sent” 
statuses). DroidWatch is configured to only filter for the sent messages; this reduces the number 
of duplicates recorded in the local database. The ability to collect the SMS information in 
DroidWatch requires that the android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS, 
android.permission.READ_SMS, and android.permission.READ_CONTACTS 
permissions be declared in the AndroidManifest. 
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 Third-Party App Logs 5.2.8.15
Android’s built-in application logging system (android.util.Log) is available for any 
Android app to use. The app logs are temporarily stored in a ring buffer in the phone’s 
/dev/log/main character device file by default. The ring buffer operates by taking in new 
logs and pushing out older ones (White, 2012). Logs can be read through a tool available in the 
Android SDK’s named Logcat. Apps that call Logcat at runtime, such as DroidWatch, must have 
the android.permission.READ_LOGS permission declared in the AndroidManifest to gain 
access to this data set. DroidWatch collects Logcat logs through an alarm scheduled to execute 
once an hour by default. 
 
Unfiltered Logcat output typically results in an overwhelming number of logs; however, steps 
were taken reduce this number by identifying and discarding logs generated by built-in Android 
apps. Known tags of system apps are included as filters in the Logcat command in addition to a 
minimum log priority level (i.e., debug logs will not be shown). Attempts are also made to 
identify the name of the system process that generated the log event. The process IDs (PIDs) that 
appear in the Logcat output are compared to a list of running processes on the device. If a PID is 
matched, its associated process name is compared against a list of known, built-in system process 
names (e.g., system, com.DroidWatch, and others) for possible exclusion from DroidWatch. 
If the name is not recognized, it is assumed to be a third-party app and thus inserted into 
DroidWatch as a new event. Upon the completion of the Logcat log analysis, the ring buffer is 
flushed to avoid duplication issues. 
 
5.3 Analysis and Evaluation 
This section describes the results of DroidWatch experimentation and applies its capabilities to 
situations where they can aid internal investigations. Experiments were scripted based on the data 
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sets collected and the author’s prior work experience. All logged events captured by detectors 
(see Appendix D for the full list of detectors) and transferred from the phone to the enterprise 
server were automatically ingested into Splunk,
13
 a well-known log indexing system with a Web 
interface for searching. Results were displayed as individual events, formatted as key-value pairs. 
All data was associated with a device ID and could be searched, filtered, and put into timelines 
for identification and trend analysis. Note that while Splunk was used in this research because of 
its cost (free for up to 500 megabytes per day), other products can perform similar functions. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the number of logged events extracted from Splunk over the span of a single 
day, broken down by data set. The sample contained 442 logs generated by one device with third-
party app logs comprising the majority of the records. Log totals per day will differ based on 
usage habits; a device that is more heavily used will see increases in log totals. No visible impacts 
to phone usage or battery life were observed throughout the tests. 
 
Figure 7. Events Logged Over 24 Hours 
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5.3.1 General Usage Trends 
ScreenWatcher, the DroidWatch detector that monitors and records a device’s screen lock status, 
is useful in determining general phone-use over time. A search for “Screen Unlocked” in Splunk 
displays a timeline of user-performed actions that indicate active phone usage (e.g., PIN code, 
gesture, or password entries). The results, which span several days, can be seen in Figure 8. This 
data can also be used to determine phone activity at a certain time, discover masquerading users 
(i.e., users other than the originally assigned user), or develop usage patterns for employees. 
 
Figure 8. Detected Screen Unlock Actions (Splunk) 
 
5.3.2 Suspicious Contacts and Communications 
DroidWatch implements a detector called ContactWatcher that monitors a phone’s address book 
for newly added contacts. Contact names or phone numbers that pose a risk to an organization 
may be discovered through searches or incorporated into Splunk triggers (available in the Splunk 
Enterprise edition), which notify investigators of a previously specified activity or activities. 
 
CallWatcher is the DroidWatch detector that identifies incoming and outgoing phone calls on a 
device. Investigators can perform searches and filters on data recorded in Splunk to discover calls 
with suspicious numbers or contact names. These may be numbers external to an organization’s 
phonebook or previously identified known-bad individuals. 
 
SMS and MMS detectors are also implemented in DroidWatch for incoming and outgoing 
message communications and may be beneficial for investigators. The recorded data can be 
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searched for suspicious activity, similar to phone call data; however, SMS message body content 
is available for mining information that may provide insight about an investigated event. An 
incoming SMS in DroidWatch can serve as a third-party time source since the timestamp is 
carved out of the protocol description unit (PDU) of the raw SMS content. The embedded time 
within the SMS structure does not rely on the phone’s clock (Casey, 2009). Some issues 
encountered during the analysis of this data were: 
 Messages sent to multiple contacts only listed a single recipient in the logs. 
 Timestamps carved out of incoming SMS messages did not contain time zone 
information. The time zone appeared to be that of the sender (not Coordinated Universal 
Time [UTC]), which may cause problems if a sender’s time zone is unknown. 
 There was no MMS message text, although a reviewer could see if text was originally 
included. 
 
As an example of the DroidWatch detectors described above, a Splunk search was performed to 
find evidence of phone calls, SMS messages, and added contacts. Results are seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Communication Related Search Results (Splunk) 
 
Splunk Enterprise triggers can be configured to notify investigators when a series of events occur. 
For example, if a picture is taken using a phone’s camera and immediately sent over MMS, the 
activity may warrant further investigation depending on the circumstances. Figure 10 shows a 
search revealing the logs of a picture taken on Saturday, December 22, 2012, at 3:20 p.m. that 
was subsequently attached to an outgoing MMS message. If it is found (possibly through GPS 
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tracking and other mechanisms) that the user was alone in the office, more analysis may be 
required to determine whether a data leakage occurred. 
 
Figure 10. Photo and MMS Search Results (Splunk) 
 
5.3.3 Location Monitoring 
Last known locations recorded by DroidWatch include the device ID, latitude, longitude, and 
capture time. The approach that DroidWatch uses to collect locations conserves battery life, but 
results in the sparse logging of recorded locations. While the detector is configured to collect the 
last known coordinates every hour by default, only four locations over a seven-day period were 
reported. Even though the GPS provider setting is enabled, the last known locations are not stored 
on a device unless the provider is actively used (i.e., the Google Maps app is opened to display 
the current position). Furthermore, a phone’s last known location is cleared upon device reboots, 
causing a stored set of coordinates to be lost before being recorded. 
 
Modifications made to a phone’s location provider settings are available; however, the logs 
contain all the statuses (e.g., enabled/disabled) for the network and GPS providers in every event 
recorded by this detector. Future work may include implementation of a third-party mechanism 
(e.g., another DroidWatch database table) to keep the state of each provider. This data is 
potentially useful if the phone’s last known location becomes more reliable. It will allow an 
analyst to locate a device when its GPS setting is turned off manually. 
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Scheduled calendar events are also beneficial to investigators. Searches can be performed on a 
user’s calendar appointments (fields include event titles and dates), which may assist with 
activities such as alibi checking, surveillance planning, or providing knowledge of a user’s travel 
plans. 
 
Search results for evidence of a device’s last known location, location provider setting changes, 
and calendar appointments are provided in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Location Related Search Results (Splunk) 
 
5.3.4 Internet History 
DroidWatch collects and makes available the events performed within the built-in Android Web 
browser. An Internet history event, found in Splunk, includes the action taken (e.g., browse or 
search), the search term or URL, the event time, and the attributed device ID. This information 
can be useful to investigators looking for suspicious browser usage on an enterprise, such as 
uploads of intellectual property to external websites. Search engine searches may also be parsed 
and utilized to better extrapolate a user’s possible intentions behind the detected actions. 
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Figure 12 shows the results of a Splunk search for “steganography.” The user performed a 
browser search for “steganography research” and then navigated to two related websites. The 
search text provides the context that the user may be performing research on the topic. 
 
Figure 12. Browser History Results (Splunk) 
 
5.3.5 Malicious Applications 
Apps that are installed or removed on mobile enterprise devices are of potential interest to 
security analysts and investigators. During an internal investigation, it may be discovered that a 
device has malware or other apps of concern. Alternatively, organizations may have mobile app 
install policies in place and then subsequently find an installed app that violates the policy. Either 
case warrants additional concerns and security measures. All app installation and removal data 
collected by DroidWatch is available for search by investigators. Provided fields include the 
app’s name, action taken, and install/removal date. 
 
Third-party app logs are also collected by DroidWatch. Several filtering mechanisms attempt to 
limit logs to only those generated by apps not built-in to the phone; however, results show that 
these filters are not completely successful. When DroidWatch was initially implemented, 
averages of 9,826 logs per device per day were generated by the Logcat detector. The initial setup 
filtered any log generated by the “system” process and other known built-in apps. Later 
improvements to DroidWatch included filters for app logs generated from the com.android, 
com.google, and com.sec.android processes, which resulted in a more manageable 
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average of 337 Logcat logs per device per day. Organizations can do more fine-tuning to tailor 
filters to their specific environments. 
 
Figure 13 shows the results of a Splunk search for app installs and third-party app logs. An app 
named StegDroid was found to have been installed, warranting additional attention due to its data 
hiding abilities. Also listed is the third-party app “com.locationlabs.v3client,” which produces an 
event in the system logs that appears to indicate that the app is listening for SMS messages. 
 
Figure 13. App Related Search Results (Splunk) 
 
5.3.6 Attribution 
Having a device report its device ID and synced account information may be useful to 
investigators for several reasons: 
1. Helps to verify and identify the user (potentially the owner) of the phone 
2. May provide clues of personal account handles and aliases that are not previously known 
3. Provides indications of how a phone is used 
4. Ties together logged events with a specific device 
The device ID (an MEID in this research) can be seen in many of the previously provided 
screenshots. Every logged event is associated with a device. Synced accounts are configured to 
report less often—every time the DroidWatch service starts. Figure 14 displays the results of a 
search for a device’s accounts, which, in this case, includes an email address, a Skype username, 
and a Facebook username. 
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Figure 14. Device Account Search Results (Splunk) 
 
5.4 Anti-Forensics 
Research presented at the 2006 DFRWS conference defines anti-forensics as “any attempt to 
compromise the availability or usefulness of evidence in the forensic process” (Harris, 2006). The 
upcoming sections are anti-forensics categories drawn from previous work conducted in the 
Android anti-forensics field and are used to assess the DroidWatch app for anti-forensic 
vulnerabilities. The categories are destroying evidence (Section 5.4.1), hiding evidence (Section 
5.4.2), altering evidence sources (Section 5.4.3), counterfeiting evidence (Section 5.4.4), and 
detecting forensics tools (Section 5.4.5) (Azadegan, Yu, Liu, Sistani, & Acharya, 2012; 
Distefano, Me, & Pace, 2010). 
 
Note that DroidWatch, in its current form, is fully susceptible to root attacks, app uninstalls, and 
process terminations. External protections offered by MDMs, such as root detection and the 
enforcement of app installation policies, are relied upon to ensure data integrity within 
DroidWatch. Future work to detect terminations of the DroidWatch process is described in 
Section 6.3. 
 
5.4.1 Destroying Evidence 
On a phone without root privileges, data sets collected through broadcast receivers and content 
observers are not likely susceptible to evidence destruction methods, since a copy of each event is 
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recorded in DroidWatch’s private directory as the event happens. Normal users, by default, do not 
have the necessary permissions to directly access content in this location. Data sets retrieved 
through alarms, however, are susceptible to destruction tactics, since it may be possible to remove 
evidence (e.g., outgoing MMS messages, third-party app logs, calendar events, browser 
navigations, browser searches, and last known GPS locations) before the next scheduled 
collection. Note that it is unlikely that a data set’s entire history will be lost, unless there is a 
continuously running deletion mechanism that removes all events shortly after they occur. 
 
One concern for DroidWatch is that other apps can register for custom intent-filter priorities. An 
app that uses the maximum intent-filter priority value, 2,147,483,647 (2
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-1), has the ability to 
intercept and drop a broadcast before another app receives it. DroidWatch uses the default intent-
filter priority value, due to its status as a research prototype, and relies upon external enforcement 
of an app installation policy for protection. Further work  on this issue (see Section 6.3) is 
proposed for future researchers to pursue. 
 
5.4.2 Hiding Evidence 
AFDroid, the anti-forensics tool developed by Distefano et al., can hide and restore data within 
AFDroid’s private folder to circumvent forensic processes. The data sets collected through 
scheduled alarms (the same as those mentioned in Section 5.4.1) are among those affected by a 
tool like AFDroid. A user wanting to hide a few recent outgoing SMS messages could use manual 
transfer methods or AFDroid to move the messages; however, upon message restores, 
DroidWatch would detect these as new events and log them. 
 
Larger amounts of a data set’s history could be hidden if an automated, continuous hiding process 
was developed and implemented onto a device. Without the enforcement of strong app 
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installation policies for smartphones deployed with DroidWatch on an enterprise, all 
DroidWatch’s data collection components are susceptible to this type of subversion. The 
aforementioned ability for apps to register custom intent-filter priorities can enable apps to hide 
data through the interception and rerouting of broadcasts. For example, GoSMS,
14
 a legitimate 
third-party SMS app, registers for the maximum possible intent-filter priority to eliminate the 
duplication of messages (Kovacevic, 2011). Like GoSMS, malicious apps may also register for 
high priorities on a phone and cause broadcasts to be rerouted. As mentioned previously, 
DroidWatch uses the default intent-filter priority, although future work (see Section 6.3) is 
proposed to mitigate this issue. 
 
5.4.3 Altering Evidence Sources 
Altering evidence sources, according to Distefano et al., involves modifying a data set to thwart a 
collection process. This anti-forensics category is another area of concern for DroidWatch. Data 
collected by alarms (the specific data sets listed in in Section 5.4.1) are susceptible because the 
utilized API methods rely on certain values in a data set to be present. For example, when looking 
for outgoing messages through the MMS content provider, the “msg_box” column indicates the 
message’s direction—with “2” representing a sent/outgoing MMS message. If this value is 
altered to “5,” the data collection component ignores the message. Such an anti-forensics 
technique may affect a data set’s entire history if implemented into a continuously running, 
automated system; otherwise, only individual events may be affected, due to the persistent nature 
of DroidWatch. 
 
Another relevant, anti-forensics concern for DroidWatch is the ability for malicious users to 
reinstall a modified version of DroidWatch. Assuming that one has an app’s Android Package 
                                                     
14
 More information about the GoSMS app can be retrieved from 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.jb.gosms. 
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file, previous work has shown that code for an app like DroidWatch can be decompiled and 
modified (Pan, 2012). The malicious user could strip the AndroidManifest of its permission 
request statements and reinstall the app on a smartphone.
15
 If successful, this process would cause 
targeted data set collections to fail on the Android device. 
 
To help combat the altering of evidence sources, strong app policies must be enforced to prevent 
the installation of apps that may cause security lapses on an enterprise. Tamper-resistance 
mechanisms can also be incorporated into DroidWatch and are proposed as future work (see 
Section 6.3). 
 
5.4.4 Counterfeiting Evidence 
Counterfeiting evidence on mobile devices involves adding fictitious data to existing data sets to 
confuse or evade investigators. All of DroidWatch’s collection components are vulnerable to this, 
because no checks are performed on newly detected events to differentiate fake entries from real 
ones. An automated counterfeiting anti-forensics mechanism that continuously adds fake data 
over time may cause some confusion; however, depending on the complexity of the fake data, it 
may be relatively easy to spot and filter the real events on the server. 
 
Adding massive amounts of fictitious data over a short time span may also result in a denial of 
service attack, another concern for DroidWatch. Should enough data be injected into a phone’s 
internal memory, the app (and other apps) may cease to function properly. Future work is 
proposed (see Section 6.3) to implement a “keep-alive” mechanism that would indicate 
disruptions in the DroidWatch service. 
                                                     
15
 During the code repackaging process of a previously decompiled app, a malicious user would be required 




5.4.5 Detecting Forensics Tools 
Considering the work done by Azadegan et al., which involved the detection of forensic processes 
on Android smartphones, it was determined that their research was not directly applicable to 
DroidWatch. They focused on listening for initial connection signatures of some well-known 
forensics tools on Android phones; if found, one of the anti-forensics methods discussed in 
Sections 5.4.1 through 5.4.4 was triggered. DroidWatch performs monitoring, unlike traditional 
forensics tools, and has no initial connection signatures or requirement for physical access to a 
device. 
 
The ideas presented by Azadegan et al., however, can be extended to detect DroidWatch’s 
scheduled collection and transfer process. For example, if DroidWatch’s pattern or “signature” of 
transfers to the enterprise server is determined, an automated tool could disable networking on a 
device just before the transfer occurs, therefore causing a denial of service on the system. Future 
work to DroidWatch may mitigate this through the randomization of the collection intervals, 
possibly through event-based triggers (i.e., data set “A” is collected when “B” happens). 
 
6 Future Work 
Future research on DroidWatch includes work on the app and the enterprise server. The 
upcoming sections will cover proposed improvements for future researchers to investigate and 
cover resolving current issues (Section 6.1), collecting additional data sets (Section 6.2), and 
implementing anti-tampering mechanisms (Section 6.3). Ideas for longer-term research are also 
proposed for potential integration (Section 6.4). 
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6.1 Resolve Current Issues 
DroidWatch warrants future work for several data sets currently used. The duplication of reported 
events by a phone is an issue; this may be resolved with improved server handling of events. 
Additionally, Logcat output, even with filters in place, continues to generate the most events of 
all the collections. A comprehensive study on the usefulness of Logcat’s reported logs to internal 
investigations could prove beneficial for the Android forensics community. Improvements to 
DroidWatch’s current thread usage, location retrieval methods, and configuration settings can 
also be developed. 
  
6.2 Additional Data Collections 
Android forensics is an evolving field that changes with each new operating system release from 
Google. As new data sets and features become available, their value to an investigation must be 
assessed for possible inclusion into a monitoring system. Future work includes the following 
additional data sets to be monitored and collected by DroidWatch: 
 USB Debugging Settings 
 Phone Restarts 
 
 Voicemail Logs 
 
 Logs of dumpsys, dumpstate, and 
dmesg. 
A user attempting to subvert security apps or policies may enable USB debugging on a phone to 
obtain command line access from a laptop or desktop computer, thus providing additional options 
to explore and possibly exploit a device. Catching the generated broadcast as the setting is 
enabled or disabled can be beneficial for the overall security of an enterprise, including internal 
investigations. Detecting phone restarts may also be useful for the overall security and awareness 
of a phone’s status on an enterprise. Investigators may use this in determining usage trends. 
 
47 
Voicemail log detection can also be a helpful element to internal investigations. Knowledge of a 
voicemail following a missed call increases the chance that a number was called intentionally. 
Programmatic access to the voicemail logs was added with Ice Cream Sandwich (API 14).  
 
Third-party app and system logs include those of the dumpsys, dumpstate, and dmesg 
commands, which may provide additional clues to how a phone is used. Filtering mechanisms 
similar to those used in Logcat will be required to lessen the many logs outputted by each 
command and improve the usefulness to investigators. 
 
6.3 Anti-Tampering Mechanisms 
Data collected and stored by DroidWatch on a phone currently relies on the Android built-in 
security model (Section 3.3) to prevent users and apps from malicious viewing or tampering. 
Some proposed capabilities to harden DroidWatch include: 
 Encryption of database events 
 High intent-filter priorities 
 Code obfuscation 
 Event-based collections and transfers 
 Keep-alive logging 
 Database hashing. 
 
Encrypting events in the local phone database is a mechanism to deter users from viewing or 
tampering with previously collected events. Each event will be paired with a checksum and 
encrypted using a public key infrastructure with the private key stored on the enterprise server. 
Registering for maximum intent-filter priority values in the AndroidManifest may help prevent 
other apps from suppressing a system broadcast, although further research is needed to determine 
what happens when two apps register with the same priority value (PVS, 2012). Obfuscating the 
DroidWatch source code (when integrated into other systems) may act as a deterrent because it 
can make decompiled code difficult to read and understand (Mackenzie, 2012). Event-based 
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triggers would provide a more random collection and transfer pattern and may prevent time-based 
thwarting attempts that are possible against scheduled operations; however, further research on 
the effectiveness of this capability is required. Periodic logging of “keep-alive” messages to the 
DroidWatch phone database would show disruptions in the DroidWatch service. Indications of 
tampering would be evident if it were found that a large amount of time elapsed between logged 
keep-alive messages. The final, future anti-tampering capability listed above is the hashing of 
transferred databases. Comparing hash values is a solid way to discover digital evidence 
tampering, assuming that the originating device is not compromised. 
 
6.4 Future Considerations 
The following list contains longer-term considerations for DroidWatch that require additional 
research or system redesigns: 
 GPS proximity alerting 
 Third-party admin APIs 
 Remote screen watching 
 Additional device identifiers 
 Password change detection 
 Remote imaging of SDCard 
 
 Detecting sizes of read-only partitions 
 Integration into a law enforcement tool 
 Integration into an MDM system
 
GPS proximity alerts may be configured on Android phones. These will trigger if a user’s phone 
reports its location to be near a pre-programmed set of coordinates. Support for this feature may 
require system architecture changes to DroidWatch, as communications currently travel in one 
direction: phone to server. A revised system should support server-side options relayed to mobile 
devices in order to target individual devices on an enterprise. 
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Proprietary third-party APIs created by manufacturers, such as the Samsung for Enterprise 
(SAFE) API
16
 for Samsung phones, may be worth researching to identify additional monitoring 
capabilities. The AirWatch MDM currently implements the Samsung API to gain more 




Other data set collections for future consideration are remote screen watching (mentioned in 
Section 4.2), additional device identifiers (e.g., model, firmware version, Internet Protocol 
address, and connected Bluetooth devices), and password changes. Some may require use of the 
built-in Android Admin API. 
 
DroidWatch currently monitors device activity stemming from the /data partition of a phone; 
however, it may be possible to implement mechanisms that reach out to other partitions. 
Detecting size changes to the free space within the read-only /system partition or imaging the 
/sdcard partition remotely may be helpful for investigators. 
 
Future DroidWatch considerations include the possibility of extracting some techniques used in 
this app and applying them to a tool used by law enforcement to perform stealth monitoring of a 
subject’s device. A field survey of available tools will need to be conducted and techniques to 
mask the presence of the monitoring service will need to be researched and implemented. 
 
Integration of DroidWatch into an MDM solution would be very valuable for the Android 
security communities; however, it would involve a large integration effort as most current MDM 
systems lack user monitoring features that could aid internal investigations. An overall enterprise 
security system that provides a combination of solid policy enforcement, remote device 
                                                     
16
 More information about SAFE can be retrieved from http://www.samsung.com/us/safe. 
17
 More information about AirWatch’s use of SAFE can be retrieved from http://www.air-
watch.com/solutions/android/samsung-for-enterprise. 
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management, and comprehensive user monitoring on Android devices would help close security 




The system introduced in this thesis serves as a prototype for the Android community to design 
and implement Android smartphone monitoring in enterprise environments without root 
privileges. The DroidWatch app is the first open-source solution of its kind; however, it requires 
further research and improvements to broaden its number of monitored data sets and capabilities. 
In addition, anti-tampering mechanisms will need to be implemented to increase security. As 
noted, the data collected by DroidWatch would be useful for many types of internal investigations 
for a variety of reasons. This research also provides a novel development design strategy, which 
can be used as a guide for developers needing to prioritize Android app components for 
monitoring. Finally, this thesis serves as a comprehensive list of data sets available through the 
default Android API for researchers and investigators to reference.  
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Appendix A: Android Manifest 
The following code block displays the contents of the DroidWatch AndroidManifest.xml 
file. Within it, the app’s declared permissions and registered activities, services, content 
providers, and broadcast receivers can be seen. With the exception of the 
StartupIntentReceiver broadcast receiver, which declares an intent-filter to handle the 
android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, all intent-filters associated with 





 android:versionName="1.0" > 
 
 <uses-sdk 
  android:minSdkVersion="8" 
  android:targetSdkVersion="10" /> 
  
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_SMS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_LOGS" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CALENDAR" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE" /> 
 
 <application 
  android:icon="@drawable/ic_launcher" 
  android:label="@string/app_name" 
  android:theme="@style/AppTheme" 
 android:allowBackup="false" > 
  <activity 
   android:name=".DroidWatch" 
   android:label="@string/title_activity_droidwatch" > 
   <intent-filter> 
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" /> 
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" /> 
   </intent-filter> 
  </activity> 
   
  <activity 
   android:name=".ConsentBanner" 
   android:theme="@android:style/Theme.Translucent" 
   android:launchMode="singleInstance" > 
  </activity> 
   
  <service  
   android:name=".WatcherService"  
   android:exported="false" > 
   <intent-filter> 
    <action android:name="com.droidwatch.WatcherService" /> 
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   </intent-filter> 
  </service> 
 
  <receiver android:name=".StartupIntentReceiver" > 
   <intent-filter> 
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" /> 
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.HOME" /> 
   </intent-filter> 
  </receiver> 
  <receiver android:name=".CalendarWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".LocationWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".BrowserHistoryWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".LogcatWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".MMSOutgoingWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".AppWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".SMSIncomingWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".MMSIncomingWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".LocationProviderWatcher"/> 
  <receiver android:name=".Transfer"/> 
   
  <provider  
   android:authorities="com.droidwatch.DroidWatchProvider" 
    android:multiprocess="true" 
    android:name=".DroidWatchProvider" 
   android:exported="false"> 
  </provider> 





Appendix B: Juniper Product Evaluation 
 
Evaluation Description 
This appendix details the results an evaluation of Juniper’s Junos Pulse Mobile Security Gateway 
(MSG) v3.0.3-45 performed by the author during a 30-day free trial in March 2012. MSG is part 
of Juniper’s mobile device management (MDM) system named Junos Pulse Mobile Security 
Suite (MSS) that performs remote management and some monitoring of Android, iPhone 
Operating System (iOS), and RIM devices. 
 
Purpose and Scope 
While researching various leading MDM products, Juniper’s MDM documentation listed the 
most user monitoring capabilities when compared to its competitors. This assessment was 
required to ensure that the work proposed in the thesis was original. With an understanding of the 
current state of the MDM market in respect to user monitoring, it was possible to identify gaps to 
focus on. This evaluation assesses the status of user monitoring capabilities within the MSS and 
tests features available in the MSG. Analysis and results of each test are provided. 
 
This work will not provide recommendations. It is meant to present the technology’s capabilities 




The Junos Pulse Mobile Security Suite is a commercial product made by Juniper Networks that 
includes two components: 
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1. Junos Pulse Mobile Security Gateway18 
The MSG is the central server and repository to which data sent. It has a rudimentary, 
Web-based console that allows basic admin controls of mobile device policy settings and 
viewing of some collected data. Access to the MSG was provided by Juniper as part of a 
free-trial evaluation. 
2. Junos Pulse MSS Dashboard19 
The MSS Dashboard was not available for this evaluation as Juniper does not include it 
in free-trials; however, documentation for it is available on Juniper’s website. The 
dashboard displays data reported to the MSG in a user-friendly format. It also includes 
the ability to view all reported data sets. 
 
As of March 2012, the cost for deploying Juniper MSS agents on up to 5,000 mobile devices is 
$291,479 per year. MSS is offered by Juniper as a Software as a Service (SaaS) product. It is not 




 Samsung Galaxy S II Epic 4G Touch smartphone (Gingerbread v2.3.6) 
 Server hosted by Juniper (https://mss.junospulse.juniper.net/smobile/console/login.htm). 
 
  
                                                     
18
 More information about the MSG can be retrieved from 
http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/software/pulse/guides/j-pulse-mobile-3.0R1-security-admin.pdf. 
19
 More information about the MSS Dashboard can be retrieved from 
http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/software/pulse/guides/j-pulse-mobile-3.0R2-dashboard-ug.pdf. 
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MSG Configuration Settings 
 
Figure 15. Mobile Security Gateway Settings 
 
Events including SMS, call logs, and images are configured to be sent to the MSG via SSL after 
every log is recorded. Transmissions could be configured to update less frequently in real 
enterprise settings to decrease network traffic but were left “as is” for testing purposes. 
 
According to the product’s administration guide, the following data sets are not supported for 
monitoring on Android devices: 
 Email 
 MMS messages 
 Web images. 
 
This product also does not support the collection of a phone’s browser history or searches, among 
other data sets, on Android devices. These features are not present in the MSG and are not 
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mentioned in the MSS Dashboard documentation. Call logs, referenced by the “Log Voice” 
option in the settings above, can only be accessed through the MSS Dashboard, which was not 
available for testing in this evaluation (since Juniper does not include the MSS Dashboard in free-
trials). GPS coordinates are set to be retrieved from devices every 30 minutes. 
 
MSS Monitoring Capabilities 
The available MSS user monitoring capabilities, as tested and researched during the evaluation, 
are listed in Table 2. The table gives researchers an idea of features available in the MSS system 
compared with those available in DroidWatch. Each data set is highlighted in a different color, 
with the data sets available within MSS listed first. Note that “No Information Available” means 
that no details were found about the presence of a feature in the MSS. “Unable to test” means that 
a feature is listed in the MSS Dashboard documentation, but could not be tested as part of the free 
trial. 
Table 2. Junos Pulse Mobile Security Suite - Capability Chart 





SMS Collected Regularly    
View Deleted SMS     
Export SMS    
SMS Storage Limits   No information available 
View SMS Contact Name    
View SMS Contact Number    No number if name is present 
View SMS Direction    
View SMS Body    
View SMS Timestamp    
Call Log 
Call Logs Collected Regularly ?  Unable to test 
View Deleted Calls  ?  Unable to test 
Export Call Logs   No information available 
Call Log Storage Limits   No information available 
View Call Timestamp ?  Unable to test 
View Call Contact Number ?  Unable to test 
View Call Contact Name   No information available 
View Call Duration   No information available 
View Call Direction   No information available 
GPS 
Location Collected Regularly   Most locations report as null 
Export GPS Coordinates    
View GPS Storage Limits   No information available 
View GPS Latitude / Longitude    
View GPS Timestamp    
Gallery 
Images/Pics Collected Regularly    
View Deleted Images/Pics    
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Export Images/Pics    
Image/Pic Storage Limits   No information available 
View Image/Pic Filename    
View Image/Pic Timestamp    
App Installs 
Apps Collected Regularly    
View Deleted Apps   
No indication of app 
removals; current app list 
displayed 
View Added Apps   
No indication of added apps; 
current app list displayed 
Export Installed Apps    
App List Storage Limits   No information available 
View App Install/Removal Timestamp    
View App Package Name    
Contacts 
Contacts Collected Regularly    
View Deleted Contacts   
No indication of deleted 
contacts; current list displayed 
View Added Contacts   
No indication of added 
contacts; current list displayed 
Export Contacts    
Contacts Storage Limit   No information available 
View Contact Name    
View Contact Number    
View Contact Number Type (e.g., 
Home, Work, Cell) 
   
View Contact Date Added    
Device ID 
Device ID Collected Regularly    
View Device ID Collection Timestamp    
Calendar Calendar Collected    
MMS MMS Collected    
Browser Searches Browser Searches Collected    
Browser History Browser Websites Collected    
Screen Locks Screen Lock Statuses Collected    
GPS Setting GPS Settings Collected     
Device Accounts Device Accounts Collected     




Every SMS message sent and received on the phone appears to be recorded on the server. As of 
the last day of the evaluation, the message counter within the MSG’s “Messages—View Detail” 
screen lists 832 messages captured; however, due to a bug in the interface, only the latest 20 
messages could be viewed.  
 
SMS messages are pushed to the server as they are received on the phone, as specified in the 
settings. The interface lists a timestamp, a contact name/number, a subject, and a body for each 
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SMS message. A contact’s name replaces the number if matching contact information is 
available. The subject field appears to mimic the body field for each SMS message. There also 
appears to be no ability to export content from the MSG interface. Figure 16 is a snapshot of the 
interface listing SMS messages. 
 
Figure 16. MSG SMS Interface 
 
Call Log Capture 
According to product documentation, call logs are only available for viewing from the MSS 
Dashboard. Since the dashboard interface was not available to be tested for this evaluation, all 
tests related to this category were marked “Unable to test.” Documentation notes that call 




Between March 3, 2012 (start of the evaluation) and March 9, 2012, GPS coordinates were 
reported every 30 minutes, as specified in the settings. If the phone’s GPS provider setting was 
switched off, the latitude and longitude were reported as “0.0.” After March 9, 2012, the phone 
failed to report its GPS coordinates to the server for unknown reasons. 
 
During this period, 264 GPS submissions were found, all of which could be exported to a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet or a tab-separated format file from the MSG. The “GPS Tracking 
Report” interface, as seen in Figure 17, includes timestamps and an option to map the coordinates 
on Google Maps. 
 
Figure 17. GPS Capture Interface 
 
Image Capture 
The image collections rarely appeared to function properly during the MSS evaluation. Six 
pictures were taken on the phone; only one was found on the server. The sole reported picture 
appeared after it was uploaded to a social networking site, and the interface provided no 
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mechanism to export it or get more information. A screenshot of the interface that lists the 
reported images can be seen in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Image Capture Interface 
 
App Capture 
The MSG’s “Apps—View Details” screen, as seen in Figure 19, shows a listing of all apps 
currently installed on a phone. Each app is listed alphabetically with its associated package name. 
Since no timestamps are reported and the interface only displays the current list of installed apps, 
it is infeasible to identify when an app was installed or removed from a phone. There was also no 
ability to export the app list from the interface. 
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Figure 19. App Capture Interface 
 
Contacts Capture 
The “Contacts—View Details” screen, as seen in Figure 20, is a listing of all contacts currently 
maintained on the phone. The contacts are listed alphabetically by first name and are associated 
with a phone number. Since no timestamps were reported and the interface only displays the 
current list of contacts, it is infeasible to detect when a contact was added. There was also no 
ability to export the contacts list. 
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Figure 20. Contacts Capture Interface 
 
Device ID Capture 
Under the “Reporting” tab seen in the backgrounds of Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20, 
several device ID specifications are displayed. Among them are the device’s IMEI, the 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity, the Mobile Subscriber ISDN, and a unique user ID 




The Junos Pulse MSS is advertised as a SaaS MDM from Juniper. According to a Juniper sales 
representative, it is not currently possible to buy an MSS server and host it on private 




After evaluating the MSS’s current user monitoring capabilities, results found that of the fifteen 
data sets collected by DroidWatch, only seven were addressed in MSS. Of the seven MSS data 
sets, several were considered incomplete when their usefulness to internal investigations was 
taken into account. Items such as message directions, call durations, app install timestamps, and 
contact added timestamps are critical fields for analysts and investigators not found in the MSS. 
The work performed in this thesis and evaluation highlights the needs for improvement in the 
MDM user monitoring realm and presents an opportunity for technology transfer.  
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Appendix C: PHP Server Code 
The following PHP code is found on the central webserver to handle the SQLite database files 
uploaded through HTTPS POST. The files are saved and ingested into the enterprise server 





// Specify uploaded file path 
$target_path = "uploads/" 
$target_path = $target_path . basename($_FILES['uploadedfile']['name'], ".db") . "_" . 
date('YmdHis') . ".db"; 
 
// Move upload to target_path 
if (move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploadedfile']['tmp_name'], $target_path)) 
{ 
// Extract deviceID from uploaded SQLite DB 
 $db   = new PDO("sqlite:$target_path"); 
 $idQuery  = "SELECT device_id FROM transfers ORDER BY _id DESC LIMIT 1"; 
 $idResult  = $db->query($idQuery); 
 $idRow   = $idResult->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC); 
 $deviceID  = $idRow['device_id']; 
 
 // Extract events from uploaded SQLite DB 
 $eventQuery = "SELECT * FROM events"; 
 $eventResult = $db->query($eventQuery); 
 $eventRows = $eventResult->fetchall(PDO:FETCH_ASSOC); 
 
 // Store data in MySQL for Splunk 
 mysql_connect("localhost","www-data",""); 
 mysql_select_db("events"); 
 foreach($eventRows as $row) 
 { 
  $eventID  = $row['_id']; 
  $detector  = mysql_real_escape_string($row['detector']); 
  $detected = $row['detected']; 
  $action  = mysql_real_escape_string($row['action']); 
  $occurred = $row['event_occurred']; 
  $date_occurred  = date('c', $occurred / 1000); 
  $description = mysql_real_escape_string($row['description']); 
  $additional_info = mysql_real_escape_string($row['additional_info']); 
  $query = "INSERT INTO events (_id, detector, action, date_occurred, description, 
additional_info, device_id) VALUES 
($eventID,'$detector','$action','$date_occurred','$description','$additional_info','$deviceID')"; 
   mysql_query($query); 
 } 









Appendix D: DroidWatch Detectors 
Detectors are mechanisms configured to watch for specific new events that happen on an Android 
device. The detector names correspond with the tags stored with an event. The list of detectors 
used in this work are in Table 3. 
Table 3. DroidWatch Detectors 
Detector Name Event Trigger 
AppWatcher App installation or removal 
BrowserWatcher URL navigations or searches in the Android 
browser 
CalendarWatcher Added calendar events 
CallWatcher Incoming/outgoing/missed calls 
ContactWatcher Added contacts 
DeviceAccountRetriever Account names (retrieved upon service start) 
GalleryWatcher Added images to the Android Gallery 
LocationWatcher Added last known location coordinates 
LogcatWatcher Added third-party app logs 
IncomingMMSWatcher Incoming MMS messages 
OutgoingMMSWatcher Outgoing MMS messages 
ProviderChangeWatcher Changes to the location provider settings 
ScreenWatcher Changes to the screen lock status 
IncomingSMSWatcher Incoming SMS messages 




Appendix E: Content Providers 
Table 4 contains a list of data sets associated with content provider URIs used during the 
development of DroidWatch. Each entry is marked as “undocumented” or “documented” 
depending on whether the URI is found in the Android API (as of API 10). Data sets that were 
not collected through a content provider are marked as not applicable (N/A). 
Table 4. Content Provider URIs Used in this Research 
Data Set Content Provider URI 
Documented? 
Yes No 
App Installs / Removals N/A   
Browser Navigation History android.provider.Browser.BOOKMARKS_URI   
Browser Searches android.provider.Browser.SEARCHES_URI   
Calendar Events content://com.android.calendar/event_entities   





Device Accounts N/A   
Device ID (e.g., IMEI, MEID, ESN) N/A   
GPS Location N/A   
Location Settings (e.g., GPS turned off) N/A   










Screen Lock Status (e.g., Unlocked) N/A   
SMS (Incoming / Outgoing)* content://sms   
Third-Party App Logs (Logcat) N/A   
*Data sets that use the “Contacts” content provider URI to associate phone numbers with names. 
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Appendix F: Glossary 
Activity Screen within an Android application that displays a user interface 
Alarm Scheduled process that can potentially recur over time 
Android Operating system made by Google, Inc. found in many mobile devices 
AndroidManifest Configuration file necessary for all Android applications; contains 
information about permissions and Android component used 
Anti-Forensics Techniques used to compromise, thwart, or minimize the usefulness of 
forensics on a system 
Apache Software that creates or enables a Web server 
API Application Programming Interface; set of documented methods that 
can be used for software component communication 
Broadcast Receiver Android application component; capable of handling system 
notification events 
BYOD Bring Your Own Device; policy that allows an organization’s 
personnel to use their own mobile devices on an enterprise 
Content Observer Android application component; receives notifications when changes 
are made to the underlying data that it is watching 
Content Provider Android application component; manages access to an underlying data 
set 
Content Resolver Android application component; manages access to a content provider 
Data Collection 
Component 
Android application components capable of collecting data 
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Data-at-rest Data on a system that is not in use; often associated with encryption 
Detector Mechanism configured to watch for specific new events that happen 
on a system 
DroidWatch Prototype system created as part of this research; composed of an 
application and a server 
Enterprise Network or networks that comprise an organization 
Enterprise App 
Deployment 
Act of installing an app to mobile devices on an organization’s 
network; commonly associated with Mobile Device Management 
Gallery Area on an Android device where pictures are stored 
HTTPS POST Communication protocol used to send form information (possibly 
containing digital files) over a network in a secure manner 
Incident Responder Person, commonly part of a larger team, who immediately handles or 
investigates events of concern to an organization 
Intent Internal Android communication message 
Intent-Filter Mechanism that handles internal Android communications; used with 
a broadcast receiver 
Investigation Systematic examination or research of someone or something; types of 
investigations referenced in this work include incident response, 
security audits, proactive monitoring, and law enforcement 
Location Provider Android mechanism that supplies a device with geo-coordinate 
information; types of location providers referenced in this work are 
network providers and Global Positioning System (GPS) providers 
Logcat Android tool; outputs application logs 
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MEID Mobile Equipment Identifier; unique device identifier; commonly 
found on code division multiple access (CDMA) phones 
MMS Multimedia Messaging System; mobile device protocol used to send 
text messages with pictures or other media 
MDM Mobile Device Management; system that manages and enforces 
security policies on enterprise mobile devices 
MySQL Open-source database system 
PDU Protocol Description Unit; raw format used to store SMS content 
PHP PHP: Hypertext Processor; server-side scripting language 
Proactive Monitoring Type of investigation; typically performed by an analyst on an 
enterprise; involves the active and continuous exploration for new 
events of concern 
Remote Wipe Capability of erasing data from a mobile device; commonly found as a 
feature on Mobile Device Management (MDM) systems 
Rooting Gaining elevated privileges on a system 
Security Auditor Person who investigates past security incidents within an organization 
Service Android application component; runs in the background for long 
periods of time 
Smartphone Mobile device able to performing advanced computing capabilities 
such as Internet browsing 
SMS Short Message Service; mobile device protocol used to send and 
receive text messages 
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Splunk Commercially available tool that ingests and displays log data 
SQLite Database management system; commonly used on Android devices 
Steganography Art of hiding messages inside unsuspected mediums 
Ubuntu Open-source Linux operating system; used to implement the server in 
this research 




Actions taken by an individual to alter components of the Android 
operating system on a device 
Version Reporting Device identification information collected from a device; common 
MDM function 
VNC Virtual Network Computing; streaming the screen of a device to a 
remote location 
VPN Virtual Private Network; extension mechanism that can be used to 
access private networks across public infrastructure 
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Appendix G: Acronyms 
API Application Programming Interface 
BYOD Bring Your Own Device 
ESN Electronic Serial Number 
MDM Mobile Device Management 
MEID Mobile Equipment Identifier 
MMS Multimedia Message Service 
MSG Mobile Security Gateway 
MSS Mobile Security Suite 
PDU Protocol Description Unit 
PHP PHP: Hypertext Processor 
PID Process ID 
RIM Research in Motion 
SaaS Software as a Service 
SCA Stored Communications Act 
SDCard Secure Digital Card 
SDK Software Development Kit 
SMS Short Message Service 
SQL Structured Query Language 
URI Uniform Resource Identifier 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
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